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Introduction 
In the enthusiasm to address the problems from ‘grad- 
ual’ pollution of the environment stemming from 
expected byproducts and waste of industrial, agricul- 
tural, transportation and extraction activities, an 
important consideration that has received relatively 
little attention among firms and government is the 
sudden and accidental releases of chemicals (with 
attendant energy consequences) that affect both work- 
ers and communities. While O’Rourke et al. (Znt. J. 
Environment and Pollution, 1996, 6(2/3), 89-112) do 
focus on the important omissions of the consideration 
of energy flows, (dissipative) products after they leave 
the industrial ecosystem, and consumption patterns, 
they make only passing reference to the importance of 
addressing worker health and safety in their discussion 
of the limitations of Industrial Ecology. 
While Industrial Ecology is being touted as a new 
all-encompassing paradigm, the centerpiece, as prac- 
ticed, is the creation of an industrial ecosystem involv- 
ing firms which often concentrate and then exchange 
materials and waste so as to minimize the costs and 
environmental effects of the disposal and incineration 
of waste, and toxic emissions to air, water, and soil. 
The organizing principle for implementing Industrial 
Ecology concepts among the exchange partners can be 
a concern for materials containing a common substance 
(e.g. a metal; see Sagar and Frosch, this volume), an 
industrial sector (e.g. petrochemicals), or a geographi- 
cal area (e.g. Kalundborg). 
A pollution prevention/cleaner production focus dif- 
fers from that of the Industrial Ecology centerpiece in 
that it argues preferentially for reduction of pollution 
‘at the source’ through input (feedstock) substitution, 
process re-design, and re-formulation of final product 
(see Oldenburg and Geiser, this volume). Some com- 
mentators have pleaded for an integrated approach 
incorporating both concepts, as well as a healthy dose 
of end-of-pipe pollution control where appropriate. 
This article argues that both pollution 
prevention/cleaner production and waste and material 
exchange, as currently practiced, pose the risk of 
‘media shifting’ from environmental problems to 
worker (and sometimes community) health and safety 
problems, for different reasons and with different 
consequences. Examples are drawn from a study of this 
media shifting found in cleaner production databases l, 
and from generic examples of materials and waste 
exchange. First, however, the concept of promoting 
inherently safer technologies through primary accident 
prevention is introduced. 
Inherent safety 
Inherent safety is an approach to chemical accident 
prevention that differs fundamentally from secondary 
accident prevention and accident mitigation 2-5. 
‘Inherent safety’-sometimes also referred to as ‘pri- 
mary prevention’-relies on the development and 
deployment of technologies that prevent the possibility 
of a chemical accident.* By comparison, ‘secondary 
prevention’ reduces the probability of a chemical acci- 
dent, and ‘mitigation’ and emergency responses seek 
to reduce the seriousness of injuries, property damage, 
and environmental damage resulting from chemical 
accidents. 
*The author is cognizant of the conventional wisdom that no tech- 
nology is entirely safe, and that it might be more accurate to describe 
various technologies as safer. However, some technologies are in 
fact absolutely safe along certain dimensions. For example, some 
chemicals are not flammable, or explosive, or toxic. Some reactions 
carried out under atmospheric pressure simply will not release their 
byproducts in a violent way. Thus, inherent safety is, in some sense, 
an ideal analogous to pollution prevention. Just as some might argue 
that pollution prevention can never be 100% achieved, purists may 
argue that technologies can only be made inherently safer, not safe. 
Articulating the ideal, however, makes an important point: dramatic, 
not marginal, changes are required to achieve both. Like pollution 
prevention, the term ‘inherently safe’ focuses attention on the pro- 
per target. 
J. Cleaner Prod., 1997, Volume 5, Number 1-2 115 
Industrial safety: N. A. Ashford 
Secondary prevention and mitigation, by themselves, 
are unable to eliminate the risk of catastrophic chemical 
accidents, although improved process safety manage- 
ment can reduce their probability and severity. Most 
chemical production involves ‘transformation’ pro- 
cesses, which are inherently complex and tightly 
coupled. ‘Normal accidents’ are an unavoidable risk of 
systems with these characteristics 6. However, the risk 
of serious, or catastrophic,, consequences need not be. 
Specific industries use many different processes. In 
many cases, alternative chemical processes exist which 
completely or almost completely eliminate the use of 
highly toxic, volatile, or flammable chemicals. Normal 
accidents arising in these systems result in significantly 
less harmful chemical reactions or releases. Replace- 
ment of existing production systems by such benign 
chemical processes-sometimes called ‘green chemis- 
try’ -as well as non-chemical approaches, are examples 
of primary accident prevention. 
Inherent safety is similar in concept to pollution 
prevention. Both attempt to prevent the possibility of 
harm-from accidents or pollution-by eliminating the 
problem at its source. Both typically involve fundamen- 
tal changes in production technology discussed above: 
substitution of chemical inputs, process redesign, or 
final product reformulation. * Secondary prevention and 
mitigation, meanwhile, are similar in concept to pol- 
lution control and remediation measures, respectively, 
in that each involves only minimal change to the core 
production system. 
The superiority of pollution prevention as a tool of 
environmental policy has been recognized for more 
than a decade ‘. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has established a hierarchy of policy choices, 
with pollution prevention given the highest priority 
over reuse or recycling, treatment, or disposal ‘. In 
1990, Congress codified, as national environmental pol- 
icy, a preference for pollution prevention over pollution 
control, when it passed the Pollution Prevention Act.? 
The logic underlying the superiority of a preventive 
approach applies equally well to chemical safety as 
to environmental protection. However, inherent safety 
measures need to be integrated with pollution preven- 
tion, so that media shifting does not occur. 
The reason why firms are embracing pollution pre- 
vention today is that: 
It has become very expensive to continue the current 
practices of waste transport/treatment and pollution 
control; the firms clearly find it in their own interest 
to adopt pollution prevention. 
The Superfund Act (SARA Title III) created joint 
and several liability for environmental damage due 
to industrial releases of toxic substances. 
*Although inherent safety and pollution prevention are similar in 
concept, there are practical differences between the two that have, 
so far, made adoption of inherent safety measures less attractive to 
industry than pollution prevention. These are discussed later in 
the article. 
t42 USC. B13101, et seq. 
3. The Emergency Preparedness and Community Right 
to Know Act (EPCRA) has provided firms and 
the public with the infomzation that revealed large 
inventories and emissions of toxic substances. 
Thus both economic and informational mechanisms 
are causing a gradual cultural shift away from pollution 
control and waste treatment and towards pollution pre- 
vention. 
With regard to primary accident prevention, the 
economic signals are not really there. Firms do not 
pay the full social costs of injuries to workers (or to 
the public) and firms are under-insured. Unlike pol- 
lution, which has to be reckoned with as a part of 
production planning, accidents are rare events and their 
consequences are not factored into the planning pro- 
cess. 
Furthermore, an organization’s gradual emissions or 
wastes can be observed and calculated for any given 
time period, and this information can be used to meas- 
ure the effectiveness of the organization’s pollution 
prevention efforts. Because acute chemical accidents 
are relatively rare events, an organization implementing 
an effective chemical safety program may therefore 
receive no form of positive feedback whatsoever. 
Because the safety system is working, accidents do not 
occur. Of course, a hazardous chemical plant may 
receive negative feedback, but only when it is too late 
to take preventive measures. 
Although firms sometimes do anticipate accidents 
and try to avoid them, the expenditures for adequate 
prevention have not been, and are not likely to be, 
invested without the right incentives. One way of 
providing the right economic incentives would be to 
require firms to identify inherently safer technologies 
through the undertaking of Technology Options Analy- 
sis which, unlike a hazard or technology assessment, 
seeks to identify superior technologies that could be 
adopted to eliminate the possibility, or to ‘dramatically 
reduce the probability, of an accidental release.* 
Pollution prevention and cleaner technology 
There is a great deal of effort being devoted in both 
North America and in Europe to the identification of 
pollution prevention/cleaner technology opportunities. 
In the USA, the EPA has created the Pollution Preven- 
tion Information Clearinghouse, which contains elec- 
*A hazard assessment, in practice, is generally limited to an evalu- 
ation of the risks associated with the firm’s established production 
technology and does not include the identification or consideration 
of alternative production technologies that may be inherently safer 
than the ones currently being employed. Consequently, hazard assess- 
ments tend to emphasize secondary accident prevention and miti- 
gation strategies, which impose engineering and administrative con- 
trols on an existing production technology, rather than primary 
accident prevention strategies, which utilize input substitution and 
process redesign to modify a production technology. In contrast to 
a hazard assessment, a technology options analysis would expand 
the evaluation to include alternative production technologies and 
would facilitate the development of primary accident prevention stm- 
tegies. 
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tronic information on promising technologies. The 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has 
created a similar system, the International Cleaner Pro- 
duction Information Clearinghouse (ICPIC) drawing 
upon US, European and other sources. 
In a project conducted for the European Commission, 
Directorate for Health, Safety, and Public Health (DG- 
V), the author and his colleagues ’ examined a rep- 
resentative selection of cases in the ICPIC system. 
Summary observations and criticisms of the content of 
the ICPIC cases are: 
?? The most striking feature of the case studies is 
their complete lack of information regarding the 
interactions of human beings with the production 
processes, materials, or products. Process engineers 
generally do not consider workers or jobs as part 
of the production process. Manufacturing engineers 
often can not answer the question ‘Where do work- 
ers fit into your new framework of process design 
for the environment and for product safety?’ From 
a worker health perspective, this is a serious problem 
that must be solved if risk shifting from the environ- 
ment to people is to be limited. 
??No information is given regarding the physical or 
economic context for the processes. It is very diffi- 
cult to know what the processes in the UNEP 
[ICPIC] database actually looked like with respect 
to the physical space in which they were located, 
the degree of automation, the quality and mainte- 
nance status of the equipment, engineering controls, 
or administrative practices used to run the processes 
including shift work. From an industrial hygiene 
perspective, it is well known that the actual conduct 
of the processes described in these case studies can 
vary considerably depending on the economic con- 
text and physical surroundings of the workplace. 
Many of these processes are used in the USA, Italy, 
and China and, in each of these countries, chemical 
manufacturing is performed using practices that 
range from manual reactor vessel charging, mixing, 
packaging, and maintenance to process steps that 
are almost completely enclosed and automatic. The 
same process under these different conditions could 
have very different implications for worker health. 
??Limited information is given regarding the physical 
form of the substances at certain stages in the 
process so that, should a worker be exposed, the 
physiologic route of entry can not be adequately 
anticipated. The physical form of substances can 
occasionally be determined by knowing process 
specifications such as temperature and pressure but 
these process specifications are not given consist- 
ently. Information is lacking about the manner in 
which materials are added to a process, maintained, 
stored and disposed. 
The authors undertook an in-depth analysis of eight 
technologies in the ICPIC system that represented a 
process or product line that has significance for the 
EU from an economic or industrial policy perspective. 
The features for the eight technologies are represented 
in Table I. The first four technologies actually worsen 
the health and safety of workers. Cases 5, 6 and 8 
describe technologies that do not trade off environmen- 
tal benefits for worsened worker health and safety but, 
on the other hand, are suboptimal from a worker 
protection perspective. That is, in cases 5, 6 and 8, 
missed opportunities for even better environmental and 
worker protection performance were identified. Case 
7 represents an example of a technology with both 
characteristics: the substitution of fluorocarbons by 
hydrocarbons introduces a risk of explosion (creating 
an adverse effect for workers); the use of multi-process 
wet cleaning would eliminate both the use of fluoro- 
carbons and hydrocarbons (a missed opportunity). 
Other examples from the literature include the substi- 
tution of HCFCs for CFCs, leading to lessened damage 
to the ozone layer, but creating a carcinogenic risk for 
workers, and the use of water-based paints, eliminating 
volatile organic solvents, but introducing a biocide 
hazard for workers. 
These examples demonstrate that a focus on either 
gradual pollution or on environmental concerns can 
overlook problems created or missed with regard to 
worker health or sudden and accidental releases. Waste 
and materials exchange create similar, but different 
problems. 
Industrial metabolism and the increased risk 
of sudden and accidental releases 
As aptly analyzed by O’Rourke et al. (this volume), 
casting a net narrowly around a problem and optimiz- 
ing the identified factors can lead to ‘disconnects’ in 
environmental, energy, and worker safety policies, and 
with the broader concept of sustainability. The practices 
of concentrating waste and byproducts, handling them, 
and transporting them can increase the probability and 
opportunity for worker exposure to toxic substances- 
and both the probability and magnitude of the risk of 
explosions, fires, and acute toxic episodes from sudden 
and accidental releases.* Examples include the concen- 
tration of carcinogenic chromium(V1) compounds, vol- 
atile organic waste products, and unstable chemical 
mixtures in waste. 
Moreover, industrial metabolism is driven by a con- 
cern for minimizing (really optimizing) expected grad- 
ual pollution (but not rare unexpected catastrophic 
events) based on cost, health and ecosystem consider- 
ations relevant to, and predictable by, the firm. Indeed, 
a distinction should be drawn between ‘full cost 
accounting’ (misleadingly named because it 
encompasses only those factors important to, or costs 
borne by, the firm) and ‘social cost accounting’, which 
*Risk factors associated with hazardous substance releases at fixed 
facilities or during transport that have public health consequences 
include ammonia, pesticide-s, volatile organic compounds, acids, and 
petroleum products ‘. Sudden releases or spills leading to worker 
exposures involve many more substances than affect the community. 
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Table 1 Characteristics of selected cleaner production technologies 
Case no. Technology Type 
External 
pollution or Worker health Accident Raw material Water use Energy 
waste status status potential status use efficiency 
7 
8 
Rapeseed oil 
extraction by 
enzymes 
Flame spray 
zinc 
Recovery of 
sulphated 
mother liquor 
Recycling of 
cyanide water 
Solvent 
substitution in 
paint 
Production of 
casting molds 
Hydrocarbon- 
based dry 
cleaning 
Wood and 
furniture 
surface 
Adverse for 
workers 
Adverse for 
workers 
Adverse for 
workers 
Adverse for 
workers 
Missed 
opportunity 
Missed 
opportunity 
Missed 
opportunity 
and adverse 
for workers 
Missed 
opportunity 
-I-+ - 
+ - 
+ - 
++ - 
+ 0 
++ -I- 
++ 0 
+ 0 
+ 
a-) 
- 
- 
0 
+ 
++ 
nla 
++ 
++ 
+ 
+ 
_ - 
++ (0, + ) 
++ (0, + 1 
0 (0, + 1 
0 n/a 
0 0 
(O,-1 n/a - - 
0 + 0 0 
+ + , significant improvement; + , improvement; 0, no change; -, deterioration; --, significant deterioration; n/a, information not available. 
addresses all flows to the society. Firms are driven by 
full cost accounting and this accounting is unlikely to 
include the unexpected and unpredictable costs of 
chemical accidents. Thus, technologies and measures 
that eliminate the probability or reduce the possibility 
of accidents are unlikely to be searched or adopted, 
and changes in industrial practices that actually increase 
the probability of accidents will be allowed to be 
implemented. 
Policy implications of 
initiatives 
recent government 
In both the USA and the European Community, 
attempts have been made to deal directly with sudden 
and accidental releases. However, seriously lacking 
is an integration of these concerns with legislation, 
regulations and policies addressing gradual pollution, 
pollution prevention, and industrial ecology. 
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1990 
directed the US Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) to promulgate a chemical pro- 
cess safety standard to prevent accidental releases of 
chemicals which could pose a threat to employees,* 
and Section 112(r) of the CAA directed the EPA to 
develop regulations, including a risk management plan 
(RMP), to prevent chemical accidents.? While OSHA 
complied with the requirements of the CAA by promul- 
gating a process safety management (PSM) standard 
on 24 February 1992,$ EPA did not promulgate its 
RMP rule, as required by the CAA, until 20 June 
*42 U.S.C. $7604. 
t42 U.S.C. 5 7412(r). 
$29 C.F.R. $1910.119. 
1996.” The PSM standard is designed to protect 
employees working in facilities that use ‘highly hazard- 
ous chemicals’, and employees working in facilities 
with more than 10 000 pounds of flammable liquids or 
gases present in one location. The list of highly hazard- 
ous chemicals in the standard includes acutely toxic, 
highly flammable, and reactive substances. The PSM 
standard requires employers to compile safety infor- 
mation (including process flow information) on chemi- 
cals and processes used in the workplace, complete a 
workplace process hazard analysis every 5 years, con- 
duct triennial compliance safety audits, develop and 
implement written operating procedures to maintain the 
integrity of process equipment, conduct extensive 
worker training, perform pre-startup reviews for new 
(and significantly modified) facilities, develop and 
implement written procedures to manage changes in 
production methods, establish an emergency action 
plan, and investigate accidents and near-misses at 
their facility. 
OSHA’s PSM standard contains various mechanisms 
to induce firms to identify and to minimize the chemi- 
cal hazards posed by their production technology. In 
essence, however, the PSM standard seeks only to 
improve safety management in facilities likely to 
experience sudden and accidental releases of highly 
hazardous chemicals that may injure workers. It 
imposes no affirmative duty to identify inherently safer 
production alternatives or to change any element of 
the facility’s actual production system. For that reason, 
the main effect of the PSM standard is to stimulate 
secondary prevention and mitigation measures. 
*40 C.F.R. Part 68. 
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EPA recently promulgated regulations setting forth 
requirements for the ‘risk management plans’ specified 
in the Clean Air Act.* The RMP rule is estimated to 
apply to some 66 000 facilities with processes that 
contain more than a threshold quantity of a regulated 
substance. All applicable processes are placed into one 
of three possible categories (‘Programs’) depending on 
the results of a hazard assessment (involving an offsite 
consequence analysis-including worst-case risk scen- 
ario-and compilation of a 5year accident history). 
Program 1 requirements apply to processes which 
have not had an accidental release with offsite conse- 
quences during the previous 5 years and for which a 
worst-case release would not affect the public. Program 
3 requirements apply to higher risk, complex chemical 
processing operations and processes already subject to 
OSHA’s PSM standard (but not eligible for Program 
1). All other covered processes must satisfy Program 
2 requirements. 
. The owner or operator of any covered process must: 
(1) prepare and submit a single risk management plan 
(RMP)-revised at least once every 5 years-covering 
all affected process and chemicals, to demonstrate com- 
pliance with all the requirements of the standard; (2) 
prepare and document the hazard analysis. For Program 
1 processes, the additional requirements are minimal: 
(1) ensure that emergency response procedures are 
coordinated with community response organizations to 
verify eligibility for Program 1; (2) completion of a 
Program 1 certification. Program 2 processes must 
document a management system, implement a more 
extensive, but still streamlined prevention program, and 
implement an emergency response program. Program 
3 requirements, which are the most stringent, include 
documentation of a management system, implemen- 
tation of a prevention program that is fundamentally 
identical to the requirements of the OSHA PSM stan- 
dard, and implementation of an emergency response 
program. 
EPA’s RMP rule addresses many but not all recog- 
nized barriers to chemical accident prevention. For 
example, the requirement that all firms owning or 
operating covered processes conduct an offsite conse- 
quence analysis, including developing worst-case acci- 
dent scenarios, will help these firms to appreciate the 
magnitude and effects of a possible serious chemical 
accident. Similarly, the RMP rule requirement that all 
covered firms prepare and submit a 5-year accident 
history will bring about significant improvements in 
accident reporting, even though inclusion of near mis- 
ses is not required as part of the accident hist0ry.t In 
addition, the requirement that all covered firms prepare 
*See 61 Federal Register 31668, et seq. (20 June 1996) codified 
at 40 C.F.R. Part 68. 
Wnly those accidents from covered processes that resulted in deaths, 
injuries, or significant property damage on-site, or known off-site 
deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, property damage, 
or environmental damage must be included the 5-year accident 
history. Near-miss accidents (that did not meet any of the previous 
criteria) need not be included. 
and submit a risk management plan promises to 
improve their accident prevention planning. However, 
the RMP requirements are flawed in that the plans need 
be revised only every 5 years, rather than annually, and 
particularly because facilities qualifying for Program 3 
are not required to perform a technology options analy- 
sis (TOA) as part of the RMP. 
EPA formally entertained, in a Supplemental Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) on the draft RMP 
rule,* the possibility of requiring covered facilities to 
perform a TOA to identify possible inherently safer 
technologies but, despite more than two dozen com- 
ments in response to the SNPRN recommending a 
mandatory TOAt and other recommendations from one 
of EPA’s grantees , lo EPA chose not to impose such 
a requirement. Instead, EPA concluded that the require- 
ments under OSHA’s PSM rule, such as a process 
hazard analysis (which permits, but does not require, 
consideration of alternative production technologies) 
and a pre-startup safety review for new or significantly 
modified facilities (undertaken after plant design and 
construction), were adequate to prevent chemical acci- 
dents-despite acknowledgment by EPA in the SNPRN 
on the draft RMP rule the advantage of conducting 
TOAs at the design stage or earlier.$ 
Hence, EPA’s RMP rule is subject to most of the 
same deficiencies and limitations as OSHA’s PSM rule 
when it comes to inherent safety. Rather than focusing 
on the need to promote technological change, EPA’s 
RMP rule takes the technologies of production as ,a 
given, and thus fails to encourage significant changes 
in chemical processes, final products, or inputs.5 As a 
result, the principal effect of the RMP standard will 
be to encourage secondary accident prevention and 
mitigation. Furthermore, by not requiring a TOA by 
the covered facilities-those qualifying for Program 3 
under the RMP rule-EPA is abandoning probably 
the most effective mechanism to coordinate pollution 
prevention and primary accident prevention. After all, 
both pollution prevention and inherent safety typically 
*See 60 Federal Register 13535 (13 March 1995). 
i_There were also numerous comments opposing either the concept 
of a TOA or the imposition of TOA requirements as part of the 
PMP rule. See 61 Federal Register 31699 (June 20, 1996). 
$See 60 Federal Register 13535 (13 March 1995). 
§Further, it appears that the new rule is actually in violation of the 
duties imposed upon EPA in the Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) of 
1990 which is not limited to gradual releases (i.e. pollution), hut 
includes sudden and accidental releases as well. Indeed, Section 
6607(b)(7) requires as an item to be reported by owners or operators 
of covered facilities ‘[t]he amount of any toxic chemical released 
into the environment which resulted from a catastrophic event, 
remedial action, or other one-time event, and is not associated with 
production processes during the year’. Section 6604(b) of the PPA 
states that as part of a strategy to promote source reduction, ‘the 
Administrator shall (1) ensure that the Agency considers the effect 
of its existing and proposed programs on source reduction efforts 
and shall review regulations of the Agency prior and subsequent to 
their proposal to determine their effect on source reduction...[and] 
(5) facilitate the adoption of source reduction by businesses’. Cer- 
tainly, EPA, in ignoring primary accident prevention approaches 
and failing to encourage or facilitate these approaches through the 
identification of superior technological options, violates the spirit if 
not the letter of the PPA. 
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involve fundamental changes in production technology 
that, applied on a firm-specific basis, are difficult to 
legislate. The more reasonable approach, common to 
both pollution prevention and inherent safety, is to 
require covered facilities to go through a planning 
process to investigate pollution prevention/inherent 
safety technologies options that might ultimately lead 
to their adoption. 
It must be candidly recognized that firms object to 
having to identify superior technologies for accident 
prevention in a formal, reportable way, because, if the 
firms acknowledge their existence, the technologies are 
relatively easy to adopt, and the firms do not implement 
the desirable changes, this increases their exposure to 
lawsuits in the event that a preventable chemical acci- 
dent occurs. This is not the case for pollution preven- 
tion, because the causal link between gradual pollution 
in the environment and environmental disease is so 
difficult to establish. This is undoubtedly one of the 
reasons why objections have been raised by industry. 
Technology option analyses are not expensive to do, 
or to report. The record accumulated for the then 
proposed rule documents that firms reported they were 
either already identifying superior technologies* and 
hence argued there was no need for the formal require- 
ments, or they were not doing them-even though 
there would be a benefit to doing so. If firms are 
already doing TOAs, formalizing the requirement 
would not add a significant burden. If they are not 
doing them, but they should be, a formal requirement 
would be beneficial and justified. 
Government should play a much more active role 
in developing and disseminating information about 
accident prevention, especially primary accident pre- 
vention. The federal government, under the direction 
of EPA and/or OSHA, could create a clearinghouse of 
information about inherently safer technologies, includ- 
ing cost and performance data. Possibly, EPA’s Pol- 
lution Prevention Information Clearinghouse could be 
expanded to include this information. Information sub- 
mitted by a firm in its technology options analysis 
might contribute to the federal government’s infor- 
mation base; conversely, information provided by the 
clearinghouse might be utilized by firms in con- 
ducting TOAs. 
At the state level, government could develop techni- 
cal assistance initiatives, including demonstration pro- 
jects of primary prevention measures. Such technical 
assistance programs can significantly reduce the techno- 
logical risks which frequently inhibit firms-parti- 
cularly small- and medium-sized firms with limited 
technological capabilities-from adopting inherently 
safer technologies. Because industry often fears or 
distrusts the actions of government, the state agencies 
should utilize trained private consultants, acting under 
*There is a small core of US industry safety professionals who are 
dedicated to inherent safety principles “*‘*. Unfortunately, they do 
not represent the mainstream. 
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contract to the state, to provide the technical assistance 
whenever possible.* 
In 1982, the European Union adopted the famous 
EU Directive (82/5Ol/EEC) on the Major Accident 
Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, the so-called 
Seveso Directive. It requires member states to ensure 
that all manufacturers prove to a ‘competent authority’ 
that major hazards have been identified in their indqs- 
trial activities, that appropriate safety measures- 
including emergency plans-have been adopted, and 
that information, training and safety equipment have 
been provided to on-site employees 14. A revised ver- 
sion of the Seveso Directive came into effect in Febru- 
ary 1997. It strengthens the original provisions and 
coverage of accident-prevention activities, as well as 
broadens the types of installations that must comply. 
Particularly worthy of note is the mention of inherent 
safety as a preferred approach to preventing chemical 
accidents in the accompanying Guidance for the Devel- 
opment of the Safety Report. 
Conclusion 
Industrial ecology, narrowly conceived as waste and 
materials exchange, or broadly conceived to include 
pollution prevention, is unlikely to address the sudden 
and accidental release of chemicals. Because of the 
relatively rare occurrence of serious chemical accidents 
compared to the expected gradual releases of pollution 
and the generation of waste, primary accident preven- 
tion involving fundamental changes such as input 
(feedstock) substitution, re-design of process, and re- 
formulation of final products is unlikely to be under- 
taken to improve safety. Thus there are certain-to-be- 
missed opportunities to improve safety. More seriously, 
however, is the enhanced likelihood that industrial 
ecology initiatives actually increase health or safety 
risks for workers, either (1) because of more concen- 
tration of wastes and recovery, exchange and transport 
of materials and waste, which pose more risks for 
workers, or (2) because of input substitutions and 
process changes, made to improve the environment, 
which actually pose health or safety hazards (such as 
shifting to HCFCs or non-CFC organic cleaning 
agents). Only a comprehensive examination of tech- 
nology options that is broadly conceived will co-optim- 
ize the achievement of environmental performance, 
safety, and material and energy utilization. 
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